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FIXING A HOLE: HOW THE CRIMINAL LAW
CAN BOLSTER REPARATIONS THEORY
ERIC L. MULLER*
Abstract: High-profile popular-press authors recently have challenged
the mainstream consensus that certain historical events should be con-
demned as injustices. These authors argue that such condemnation un-
fairly imposes modern standards on historical actors. Until now, the re-
dress movement has largely ignored these partisan revisionists who have
sought to justify the harmful decisions made by past generations. Such re-
visionism, however, threatens the very foundation of reparations theory
by persuading the public that redress is unnecessary because historical
figures actually committed no injustice by merely acting appropriately,
given the historical context in which they lived. This Article seeks to initi-
ate a dialogue regarding how to approach the task of defining a historical
injustice. The Article draws an analogy to the criminal law's "cultural de-
fense," proposing a framework by which legal scholars may fairly judge
the wrongdoing of historical actors. Although the analogy between for-
eign cultures and historical eras is imperfect, it presents a useful starting
point to stimulate critical discussion about how best to address the grow-
ing structural weakness in the foundation of reparations theory.
The past, they say, is another country.
—Rhys Isaac'
INTRODUCTION
Over approximately the past twenty years, scholars have built an
elaborate theoretical structure of reparations for historical injustices.
These scholars have paid careful attention to issues of causation,
methods of compensation and restitution, the problem of privity be-
tween wrongdoers and victims, the necessity of apology, and the viabil-
*	 2006, Eric L. Muller, George R. Ward Professor, University of North Carolina
School of Law. I had helpful conversations about many of the ideas in this Article with Bill
Marshall, Kay Levine, Deborah Weissman, Joe Kennedy, Melissa Jacoby, Maxine Eichner,
Scott Baker, Andrew Chin, Richard Myers, Leslie Branclen-Muller, Abby Muller, and Nina
Muller.
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ity of reconciliation as an alternative or supplement to reparation.2
Naturally, disagreements about the design of the structure remain,
and considerable construction work remains to be done. But there is
no doubt that a sizable scholarly structure now stands in what was
once an empty field.
That structure, however, has an unseen hole in its foundation
which threatens the integrity of the entire structure that sits atop it.
The hole has been opened by partisan historical revisionists who de-
liberately manipulate and misrepresent historical evidence for politi-
cal purposes.3 The most notorious example of this sort of revisionism
is the continuing efforts of some to undermine settled accounts of the
existence, nature, and scope of Nazi atrocities in Europe during
World War 11.4
Recently, high-profile partisan revisionism has crossed the Atlan-
tic and begun to poke at the foundations of American historiography.
In the last several years, no fewer than three works of partisan revision-
ism have climbed high on the New York Times best-seller list: Ann
Coulter's 2003 book, Treason,5 which attempts, among other things, to
justify the excesses of McCarthyism; Michelle Malkin's 2004 book, In
Defense of Internmen46 which seeks to justify the racial incarceration of
some 50,000 Japanese aliens and some 70,000 U.S. citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry during World War II; and Thomas E. Woods's 2005
book, The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History,7 which tries,
among many other things, to establish the virtue of Southern seces-
sionism and to defend the power of states to permit slavery.8 In each
instance, the author has a clear partisan purpose for his or her retell-
ing of the episode in question: Coulter seeks to establish the Demo-
2 One excellent summary is Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUM'. AM. L. 497 (2003).
3 Partisan historical revisionism must be distinguished from the healthy process of re-
vising historical understanding to take into account newly discovered evidence. Responsi-
ble and dispassionate consideration of new evidence is the essence of good historical prac-
tice; it ensures that the study of history remains fresh and vibrant.
4 David Irving is probably the best-known representative of this movement. See DEBO-
RAH LIPSTADF, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEM-
oRY 8 (1994).
5 See generally ANN COULTER, TREASON: LIBERAL TREACHERY FROM THE COLD WAR TO
THE WAR ON Thattok (2003).
6 See generally MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR "RACIAL
PROFILING" IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004).
7 See generally THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (2004).
8 See id. at 43-75.
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cratic Party as a party of traitors to the United States, Malkin seeks to
advance an agenda of aggressive racial and religious profiling against
Arabs and Muslims, and Woods seeks to further the efforts of radical
libertarians to undermine all federal power.
Scholars might prefer to ignore these popular-press books and
their authors, but they do so at their peril. Not only do these revision-
ist works draw more public attention and a larger readership than any
work of mainstream scholarship could hope to attain, but, in the
name of current political goals, these authors also bash away at the
foundations for recognizing three of the most important episodes of
historic American injustice: slavery, the Japanese American intern-
ment, and McCarthyism.
For scholars who focus on reparations theory, these works could
not be more threatening; they tear open holes in the foundation of
reparations theory by seeking to persuade millions of Americans that
what we commonly take to be episodes of historical injustice were not,
in fact, unjust. All of the carefully wrought theories of restitution, re-
covery, causation, reconciliation, and apology that scholars have devel-
oped in recent decades will surely be for naught if Americans come to
believe that American history includes no episodes of true injustice.
This Article calls for repair of this critical hole in the foundation
of reparations theory. It seeks to' initiate discussion about how best to
repair the hole by proposing an approach to defining historical injus-
tice derived from principles of American criminal law. The method
proceeds by analogy: it compares the problem of judging the wrong-
doing of historical actors with the familiar criminal law problem
known as the "cultural defense." The cultural defense is a legal strat-
egy in which a defendant presents evidence of his or her cultural
background to attempt to avoid criminal liability. 9 In a typical cultural
defense case, a recent immigrant from a foreign culture argues that it
is unfair to judge her here for an act that was permissible, or at least
tolerated, under her foreign culture's legal, ethical, or social norms. 19
The cultural defense might first appear to have little to do with the
problem of defining historical injustice. But the problem of defining
historical injustice typically arises as a debate about whether it is fair
to judge the actions of a historical figure by current legal and ethical
9
 See Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Frame-
work for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (1997); Leti Volpp, (Mis)ldentiting Culture:
Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"17 14A ay. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 57 (1994).
10
 For a full definition of the term "cultural defense," see Volpp, supra note 9, at 57.
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standards, rather than the standards of her earlier era." Seen this way,
the analogy emerges: just as we might consider excusing a person be-
cause of where she is from, we might also consider excusing a person
because of when she is from. It is an analogy between the culture of a
place and the culture of an era.
The fact is, however, that American criminal law very rarely ex-
cuses a person because of culture. 12 Indeed, no American jurisdiction
has recognized a complete, free-standing cultural defense to criminal
liability." By and large, the cultural defense has failed as an innovation
in American law, and immigrants are usually judged by the same stan-
dards as non-immigrants." Only in the rare circumstance where the
overwhelming influence of an immigrant's culture completely vitiates
his mens rea does the law relent and excuse the immigrant's act. 15
The criminal law's near-total repudiation of the cultural defense
suggests that we ought to be similarly wary of its temporal cousin.
That is, just as we have good reasons to decline to excuse a person
simply because of his cultural background, we have similarly good
reasons to decline to excuse a person simply because of his historical
background. We should not shy away from labeling slave ownership,
racial internment, or McCarthyism as historical injustices simply be-
cause their wrongfulness is clearer to us today than it may have been
to the perpetrators at the time. Instead, as with the cultural defense,
we should excuse a historical actor and find no historical injustice
" See generally, e.g., MALKIN, supra note 6.
12 See Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the
Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 Burr. L. REV. 829, 831-32 (1999) (noting the
infrequency of application of the cultural defense at the appellate level).
Is See Dierdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distor-
tion of Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1, 19 (1994); see also Volpp, supra note 9, at 57.
14 See MASON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 6 (2004) ("[l]udges often
exclude evidence about cultural background on the ground that it is 'irrelevant.'").
15 See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multicultural-
1st Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. lbw. 36, 70-86 (1995). To
be sure, rare cases arise in which an overpowering cultural influence prevents a defendant
from forming the mens rea that the law requires. Such a case was arguably People v. Chen.
See Kim, supra note 9, at 119-21 (describing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. CL
Mar. 21, 1989)). Another such case was State u Kargar. See Wanderer & Connors, supra note
12, at 836-42 (analyzing at length State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996)). More com-
monly, judges consider mitigating evidence of a defendant's cultural background in decid-
ing whether the defendant deserves a modest break at sentencing. For more on this ap-
proach, see Damian W. Sikora, Note, Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A Sensible
Alternative: Using Cultural Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1695 (2001).
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only where the attitudes and urgencies of an actor's historical era viti-
ate his mens rea.
Although it is admittedly odd to think of historical actors having
or not having a mens rea, this Article identifies several factors relating
to the chosenness of the actor's conduct that can help us distinguish
past acts that should be wholly or partly excused from those that
should not. The inquiry will focus on the political and social climate,
moral norms, and behavioral expectations of the actor's day. Were
they truly monolithic? Did the actor's society know a rival tradition?
Did the actor have access to that rival tradition? In other words, do we
look back on the actor's behavior and see it as a choice, an act of inde-
pendent moral agency, rather than an inevitability? Only to the extent
that we see behavior as inevitable should we think about labeling it as
something other than a historical injustice.
This Article does not maintain that the analogy between foreign
cultures and earlier eras is perfect, or that it single-handedly solves
the problem of defining historical injustice. Rather, it is merely an ini-
tial effort to fix a hole in the foundation of reparations theory that
scholars have ignored until now, which is growing larger and more
dangerous with the ascension of each new partisan revisionist tome up
the New York Times best-seller h ist. Other methods for fixing the hole
should—and hopefully will—come from other areas of the law and
from disciplines outside of law entirely, most notably history and phi-
losophy. This Article will have more than served its task if it draws at-
tention to this growing structural weakness in the foundation of repa-
rations theory and stimulates critical discussion about how best to fix
it—whether by analogy to the criminal law's cultural defense, or by
some other method.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that leading works on repara-
tions theory have not adequately defined what constitutes a historical
injustice. 16 Part II uses the example of the Japanese American in-
ternment during World War II to illustrate the problems that can re-
sult from the failure to define a historical injustice)? Part III intro-
duces an analogy between the criminal law's "cultural defense" and a
"temporal defense," suggesting a framework by which reparations
scholars may begin to address the challenge of assigning culpability to
historical actors. 18 This Part then considers several possible flaws in
16 See infra notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 53-86 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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the analogy and examines how such challenges may be addressed.19
Part IV examines the scholarly debate regarding the dangers and ad-
vantages of allowing cultural evidence to excuse the actions of crimi-
nal defendants, and discusses how these debates can provide guidance
for assigning culpability to historical actors." Part V discusses how cul-
tural evidence can negate the mens rea element of a diminal act, and
draws upon historical examples to recommend a similar "lack of mens
rea" defense for historical actors.2, Finally, Part VI applies this frame-
work to examine the culpability of historical actors responsible for the
Japanese American internment to determine whether this episode
should be regarded as a historical injustice meriting redress.22
I. THE DANGEROUS HOLE IN THE FOUNDATION
OF REPARATIONS THEORY
It is difficult to point out something that is absent. But something
crucial—indeed, foundational—is missing from the sizable literature
on reparations. What is missing is a theory of how to define a poten-
tially reparable historic injustice.
Consider several leading works on reparations. In Politics and the
Past: On Repeating Historical Injustices, edited by sociologist John Tor-
pey, an array of scholars in law, sociology, history, and anthropology
discuss and debate a variety of problems in the theory and practice of
reparations, restitution, and apology.23 Yet all have a common point of
departure: an assumption that what needs discussing is how best to
respond to "claims for mending past wrongs that are ... extremely
varied, running the gamut from specific human rights abuses against
individuals such as unjust imprisonment and torture to such diverse
social systems as plantation slavery, apartheid, and colonialism."24
That is, the existence of these "past wrongs" is the shared premise of
the entire project. Each scholar simply assumes that instances of tor-
ture, unjust imprisonment, slavery, apartheid, and colonialism are
"wrongs," and the more interesting question is how scholars with a
focus on transitional justice, reparations, apology, and reconciliation
19 See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 97-129 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 130-97 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 198-234 and accompanying text.
23 See generally POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John
Torpey ed., 2003) [hereinafter Pourics AND THE PAST].
24 Id. at 5-6.
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respond to these "wrongs."25 Nowhere in the volume does any scholar
attempt to explain what makes these historical episodes the sorts of
"wrongs" that potentially merit redress."
Martha Minow's excellent volume, Between Vengeance and Forgive-
ness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence, proceeds from the
same premise. 27 "This book explores how some nations have searched
for a formal response to atrocity, some national or international re-
framing of the events," explains Minow in the book's introduction. 28
The book's very subtitle makes her premise clear: its two factual
predicates—"genocide" and "mass violence"—leave no space for dis-
agreement over whether a wrong occurred. Injustice is simply (and, in
the cases of genocide and mass violence, undoubtedly correctly) as-
sumed; Minow's question is how to steer a path "between vengeance
and forgiveness" in reconciliation efforts in injustice's wake.
The same premise supports Jeremy Waldron's influential and
challenging essay, Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession. 29
Unlike many other scholars who write about reparations, Waldron is
not particularly supportive of non-symbolic compensatory reparations
for historic injustices." But Waldron's reason for opposing repara-
tions is not that he questions the existence or the definition of under-
lying historic injustices. 8 ' Quite the opposite is true. "Historic injus-
tice" is not merely the premise but the title of his essay, and he begins
25 One slight exception to this statement is Alan Cairns's contribution to this volume.
See Alan Cairns, Coming to Terms with the Past, in POLITICS AND THE PAST, supra note 23, at
63-90. Cairns writes broadly of the need to "come to terms with the past," which entails
"seeing the behavior of our predecessors, and sometimes of our earlier selves, in terms of
its consequences for contemporary generations." Id. at 66. He also emphasizes the impor-
tance of "the scholarly recovery and interpretation of historical facts, including the
identification of who did what to whom"—"the prosaic, yet noble, goal of finding out what
happened." Id. at 70. Cairns does not, however, suggest any sort of method for such an
inquiry, nor any way of distinguishing historical wrong from right. See id. at 63-90.
26 See generally POIJTICS AND THE PAST, supra note 23.
27 See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HIS-
TORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
28 Id. at 2.
2° See Jeremy Waldron, Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession, in JUSTICE.,
ETHICS, AND NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY 139, 139-70 (Graham Oddie & Roy Perrett eds.,
1992).
3° Waldron does, however, support efforts at redress that he deems symbolic rather
than compensatory. The federal government's token redress payments of $20,000 to sur-
viving Japanese American internees is an example of the sort of symbolic reparations that
Waldron supports. Sa id. at 143.
31 Waldron argues that changes in the circumstances of the descendants of the wrong-
doer, the victim, and third parties result in the supersession of the underlying wrong, and
that compensatory reparations are therefore unjust. See id. at 159-66.
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by writing: "In reviewing our history, we come across events that can
only be described as injustices."32 This is not an essay that entertains
doubt about what constitutes a potentially compensable wrong. "Peo-
ple, or whole peoples, were attacked, defrauded, and expropriated,"
Waldron reports; "their lands were stolen and their lives were ru-
ined?" Waldron's question is not whether these were in fact instances
of injustice; instead he asks, "As we become aware of these injustices,
what are we to do about them?"34
Mari Matsuda's seminal treatment of reparations, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations similarly slights the ques-
tion of how to define a compensable historical injustice. 35 Matsuda
contemplates reparations for "racist acts, "36 but does not define them
further. She also writes aspirationally of "physical liberty from con-
straint of the person"; "freedom from life-threatening abuse as well as
the right to seek the nurturance and livelihood human beings need
for survival"; rights to "personhood and participation—the recogni-
tion of one's existence as a human being, free and equal, with power
and control over the political processes that govern one's life"; "free-
dom from public and private racism[;] freedom from inequalities of
wealth distribution[;] and freedom from domination by dynasties." 37
Nowhere, however, does Matsuda establish that the intentional or un-
intentional denial of these privileges and freedoms at any particular
point in American history was (or will be) an episode that would
cause a redressable injury to accrue. 38
To its credit, the most comprehensive edited volume in the legal
literature on reparations recognizes that a historic injustice cannot be
assumed, but must be proven." Roy L. Brooks, the volume's editor,
identifies five requirements for "a meritorious redress claim," the first
32 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
" Id.
34 Waldron, supra note 29, at 139.
35 See generally Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 Flmtv. C.12.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987).
" Id. at 390.
37 Id. at 389-90.
" Writing in the mid-1980s, as the movement for Japanese American redress was gath-
ering steam, Matsuda may have assumed a growing consensus about the injustice of at least
some episodes in American history, such as the Japanese American internment. Sadly,
however, Michelle Malkin's popular book justifying the internment shows that any such
optimism was misplaced. See generally MALKIN, supra note 6.
" See Roy L. Brooks, Introduction to WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY
OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 1, 7 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999)
[hereinafter Brooks, Introduction to WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH].
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two of which are that "a human injustice must have been committed"
and that "it must be well-documented?" Brooks does not leave mat-
ters there; he defines his terms.'" But perplexingly, Brooks anchors his
definition of a historical "human injustice" in the present day. Brooks
begins with Article 55(c) of the Charter of the United Nations (the
"U.N."), which commits the U.N. to the promotion of "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 42 He
adds to that the "various multilateral and bilateral conventions, cove-
nants, resolutions, and treaties" that "more sharply define the rights of
all humans," as well as the prohibitions of customary international
law.43
 In sum, he states that a historical human injustice is simply "the
violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental freedoms
recognized by international law.""
Brooks deserves credit for attending to the problem of defining
historical injustice, something other scholars ignore. But surely the
definitional problem cannot be as focused in the present as Brooks
makes it out to be. Debates about reparations are typically about past,
not present, wrongdoing." This is certainly true in the American con-
text. Our great reparations debates are, and will continue to be, about
conduct that is generations old: slavery, Jim Crow, the eviction of
American Indians from their native lands, and the decimation of the
American Indian population and culture." Various devastating effects
of these old American policies linger to the present day, but the pri-
mary human choices that created them and nourished them in their
40 Id. (citing Matsuda, supra note 35, at 362-97).
41 Id.
42 Id. (quoting U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c).
45 Id.
44 See Brooks, Introduction to WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 39, at 3-11. In a
slightly more recent work, Professor Brooks modified his approach, contending that repa-
rations "apply only to certain types of wrongs, to wit, gross violations of fundamental inter-
national human rights, such as slavery, genocide, and Apartheid." Roy L. Brooks, Getting
Reparations for Slavery Right—A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 25],
255 (2004) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right].
Claims for reparations, Brooks argued, "characteristically arise only in the context of an
atrocity." Id. The leading American example of reparations, however, is the Japanese
American internment—a deep injustice and a civil liberties disaster, to be sure, but not
what the word "atrocity" typically connotes.,
4.5
	 be sure, some wrongdoing--,the genocide in Rwanda, for example—is
sufficiently recent to be controlled by current treaties, human rights law, and modern cus-
tomary international law. See Mulow, , supra note 27, at 122-31 (discussing modern use and
shortcomings of international war crimes tribunals and truth commissions).
46 This list is illustrative, not exhaustive,
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infancy are decades, even centuries, old. It is, to say the least, • deeply
contestable to maintain that the international human rights law of the
year 2006 should govern our inquiry into the extent to which, for ex-
ample, seventeenth-century slave ownership or nineteenth-century
American Indian policy was an injustice in its own time.
Naturally, we might choose to create systems of redress for these
episodes without regard for whether they were unjust in their own
time. We might create such systems for what Jeremy Waldron calls the
"symbolic function of embodying ... remembrance,"47 or we might do
so for a variety of essentially present-focused or forward-looking rea-
sons.48 We might choose to redress past suffering to make a statement
about what our present values are, regardless of what our predeces-
sors' values were, or to foster political reconciliation. But to the extent
that our reasons for creating such systems are essentially backward-
looking—that is, to the extent that they are compensatory and predi-
cated on a debt or obligation that accrued in the past and survives to
this day—we must confront the question of whether a perpetrator's
conduct was wrong in its day.
For this task, current-day human rights law will often be beside
the point. For example, Brooks includes the following on his list of
potentially redressable historic injustices:
genocide; slavery; extrajudicial killings; torture and other
cruel or degrading treatment; arbitrary detention; rape; the
denial of due process of law; forced refugee movements; the
deprivation of a means of subsistence; the denial of universal
suffrage; and discrimination, distinction, exclusion, or pref-
erence based on race, sex, descent, religion, or other identi-
fying factor with the purpose or effect of impairing the rec-
ognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, so-
cial, economic, cultural, or any other field of public life."
It is troubling enough that a few of the listed behaviors, especially
those toward the bottom of the list, are not condemned under current
47 See Waldron, supra note 29, at 143.
48 Professor Brooks helpfully distinguishes among various backward- and forward-
looking approaches to redress in Getting Reparations for Slavery Right See Brooks, Getting
Reparations for Slavery Right, supra note 44, at 269-86.
4° Brooks, Introduction LO WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 39, at 7.
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law. 50 But many more of the items on the list would not have raised
concerns of injustice in countless societies through much of human
history. And at least one important item on the list—"the denial of
due process of law"—has meant vastly different things at different
moments in American history. 51 A "denial of due process of law"
defies understanding as a historical injustice except by reference to
the historical era in which it occurred. 52
Of course, the mere fact that earlier generations may have endorsed
or condoned certain practices should not by itself prevent us from seeing
them as historical injustices. It is precisely the goal of this Article to
stimulate thinking and debate about which historical practices; although
condoned in their day, ought nonetheless to qualify as potentially re-
dressable injustices. But careful analysis and debate are necessary—
rather than merely invoking modern legal standards—if reparations the-
ory is to avoid the risks of presentism and hindsight judgment that can
skew our assessment of the acts of earlier generations.
II. THE DANGER ILLUSTRATED: THE EXAMPLE OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT
The absence of a definition of historical injustice is not a mere
conceptual flaw in reparations theory. It is a structural weakness that
threatens the integrity of the entire project of compensatory repara-
tions. No episode of American historical injustice illustrates the dan-
ger as vividly as the incarceration 53 of Japanese Americans during
World War II and the successful—but newly questioned—movement
to obtain reparations for surviving internees. 54
The underlying story of historical injustice is well known. In early
1942, after intense lobbying by West Coast racial nativists, economic
5° For example, in many instances American law does not forbid governments from
taking action along lines of race, gender, or religion, with a disparate effect but no dis-
criminatory purpose. See, e.g., Washington V. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-40 (1976).
51 See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 S.U. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1992).
52 See id.
59 This Article will interchangeably refer to the wartime detention of Japanese Ameri-
cans by its popular, albeit inaccurate, name—"internment —and by the accurate term
"incarceration." For a perceptive discussion of the importance of accurate nomenclature
in speaking and writing about this episode, see Roger Daniels, Words Do Matter: A Note on
Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans, in NIKKEI IN THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND JAPANESE CANADIANS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 190,190-214 (Louis Fiset & Gail M. Nomura eds., 2005).
54 See ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES
SINCE 1850, at 331-41 (1988) (describing development of the Japanese American redress
movement).
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competitors of Japanese farmers, hysterical newspaper columnists,
and elected officials, the federal government evicted all people of
Japanese ancestry from their homes in a wide strip along the Pacific
Coast and forced them into detention behind barbed wire. 55 Nearly
120,000 people were displaced, two-thirds of whom were U.S. cid-
zens.56 No legal process of any sort accompanied this mass exclusion
or the multi-year incarceration that followed. 57 The government's
stated theory was that each and every one of these people—citizen
and alien, child and adult, the orphaned, the disabled, and the ter-
minally ill—were members of an "enemy race" and, therefore, poten-
tial spies and saboteurs. 58
It was not until the mid-1970s—three decades after the last of the
internees emerged from behind barbed wire—that survivors and their
children began to press for a government inquiry into how the op-
pressive wartime policy came about. 59 That pressure resulted in the
establishment in 1980 of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians (the "Commission"), a blue-ribbon and bi-
partisan panel of political leaders, administrators, judges, community
leaders, and scholars that was to investigate the government's wartime
policies and report its findings to Congress 6 0 The Commission held
twenty days of public hearings and delved deeply into archival hold-
ings during a comprehensive investigation which lasted almost two
years. 61 In February of 1983, the Commission issued its unanimous
report to Congress, concluding that the policy of excluding Japanese
Americans from the West Coast "was not justified by military neces-
sity" and that the long-term mass detention that followed was "not
M Excellent accounts of the decision-making process that led to the exclusion and in-
carceration of Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry include ROGER
DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II (1972);
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES
(1983); TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN IMPRISON-
MENT DURING WORLD WAR II (2003); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: MR
AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS (2001).
56 See KASHIMA, supra note 55, at 4.
57 See id. at 48-66.
58 See Memorandum from Lt. Cenjohn L. DeWitt to Sec'y of War Henry Stimson (Feb.
13, 1942), available at http://www.unc.edu/-emuller/isthatlegal/DeWittljpg, http://www.
unc.edu/-emuller/isthatlegal/DeWitt2jpg.
" Roger Daniels has summarized the background of the redress movement. DANIELS,
supra note 54, at 331-41.
60 See Tetsuden Kashima, Foreword to COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND IN-
TERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, at i, xvi-xvii (Civil Liberties Pub.
Educ. Fund ed., 1997) (1982).
61 Id. at xvii.
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driven by analysis of military conditions."62 'The broad historical
causes which shaped these decisions," said the Commission, "were
race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership."63
The Commission also recommended a number of remedial ac-
tions to Congress "as an act of national apology."'" These included
legislation "recogniz[ing] that a grave injustice was done and of-
felling] the apologies of the nation for the acts of exclusion, removal
and detention"; presidential pardons for Japanese Americans con-
victed of resisting exclusion and internment; liberal administrative
review of Japanese American claims for restitution for lost positions,
status, or entitlements; the creation of an educational and humanitar-
ian foundation; and a "one-time per capita compensatory payment of
$20,000" to each surviving internee.° Five years later, after extensive
lobbying and debate, the Commission's five recommendations be-
came law when President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of
1988.66 In 1990, President Bush issued a formal apology and the gov-
ernment sent out the first $20,000 redress checks.°
The success of the Japanese American redress movement made it
a sort of "poster child" of American reparations theory—a "monu-
mental," even "unique" political achievement° that had, and contin-
ues to have, the potential to serve as a model for the redress claims of
other victims of historical injustices.° Yet that success has also placed
the movement for Japanese American redress in the crosshairs of the
partisan historical revisionists. For a time, the revisionist efforts sat at
the fringes of public discourse, appearing mostly in vanity-press
books" and Internet discussions. In 2004, however, Fox News com-
mentator Michelle Malkin grabbed these fringe critiques and thrust
them before the eyes and ears of millions of readers, television view-
62 Id. at xvii; PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 60, at 18.
63 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 60, at 18.
I" Id. at 462.
65 See id. at 462-66. Commissioner Daniel Lungren, a U.S. Representative from Cali-
fornia, dissented from the last of these recommendations. See id.
66 Pub. L. No. 100-383,102 Stat. 903 (1988).
67 See KessmimA, supra note 55, at 221.
68 Roy L. Brooks, Japanese American Redress and the American Political Process: A Unique
Achievement?, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 39, at 162.
69 See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and Afri-
can A merican Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998).
70 See generally DAVID D. LOWMAN, MAGIC: THE UNTOLD S'FORY or U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AND TIIE EVACUATION Or JAPANESE RESIDENTS FROM THE WEST Coaar DURING WWII (2000);
KEIT! ROBAR, INTELLIGENCE, INTERNMENT AND Rle.I.00ATION: RoosEVELT'S EXECUTIVE OR-
DER 9066: 1-low Top SECRET 'MAGIC" INTELLIGENCE LED TO EVACUATION (2000).
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ers, and radio listeners with her best-selling book In Defense of Intern-
ment" and her many book-related radio and television appearances.
Those who oppose reparations for historical injustices typically
have a number of arguments at their disposal: the perpetrators are
long dead, or the victims are long dead, or no non-arbitrary class of
victims can be designated, or too many decades or centuries have
passed to allow a rational calculation of compensation, or the wrongs
were insufficiently documented. 72 In the case of the Japanese Ameri-
can internment, these usual arguments fail: some perpetrators and
victims were (and are) still alive, redress payments went only to those
personally affected by the unjust policy, and the injuries are well
documented and remain in the memories of people still living." The
revisionist strategy must therefore be more direct: it must challenge
the premise that a redressable injury ever occurred. It must maintain
that the Japanese American internment was justified.
That is precisely the argument that Malkin's book makes. Its self-
described mission is to "debunk[] the great myth of the 'Japanese
American internment' as 'racist' and `unjustifiecl." 14 Its "central thesis
... is that the national security measures taken during World War II
were justifiable, given what was known and nol known at the time." 75
These measures were "not based primarily on racism and wartime hys-
teria,"76 the book maintains, but rather were military reactions to a
handful of top-secret decoded Japanese diplomatic messages that sug-
gested Japanese efforts to recruit Japanese American spies on the
West Coast." They were reasoned decisions by "serious men, aware of
the gravity of both their actions and inaction"—men who "did not
have the luxury of a rearview mirror?"
This last point is the book's springboard from justifying intern-
ment to assaulting redress. According to Malkin, the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians issued "a false ac-
count" of the historical episode." It did so because of intimidation by
71 See generally MALKIN, supra note 6.
72 See Brophy, sups note 2, at 501-25.
77 See DANIELS, supra note 54, at 340 (explaining that the Japanese American redress
program provided a one-time per capita compensatory payment to each of the survivors of
the relocation).
74 MALKIN, ROM note 6, at %H.
77 Id. at %XXIII.
76 /d. at 80.
" Id. at 37-51,78-80.
77 Id. at xxxiv.
79 MALKIN, supra note 6, at 115.
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the "America-bashing"80 Japanese American redress movement, a
group of "civil rights absolutists and ethnic lobbyists ... with an intel-
lectual arrogance that only 20/20 hindsight can instill."81 According
to Malkin, the redress movement fell victim to "the danger of judging
the wartime measures after the fact and out of historical context," 82
and ignored the "risks of sabotage and espionage" that "reasonable
men" of that day "vividly perceived."83 For Malkin, the nub of the
problem is hindsight: the exclusion and internment of 120,000 peo-
ple were the justified judgments of their era's reasonable minds. 84
Such judgments reflected wisdom, not injustice—and wisdom needs
no apology.85
It is not the concern of this Article to establish the incomplete-
ness, the illogic, the deceptiveness, and the outright falsehood of
Malkin's historical account. 86 What is important is the danger that
Malkin's method poses for reparations theory and practice. Repara-
tions theory sits atop an assumption that American history includes
episodes of injustice—policies and behaviors that were wrong in their
time, and whose traumatizing, stigmatizing, and impoverishing effects
linger to the present day. Actual reparations movements depend upon
something approaching political consensus that such episodes oc-
curred. Even for such horrific chapters as slave ownership, the sup-
pression of indigenous peoples and cultures, and mass racial intern-
ment, the consensus that these were unambiguous instances of
injustice is, in the context of American history, recent. Partisan his-
torical revisionism of the sort preached in Malkin's In Defense of In-
ternment tears a hole in that consensus, and accordingly, the structure
built upon the consensus weakens.
It is time for scholars to begin to fill that hole.
80 Id. at 116.
8 ' Id. at xxx iv.
82 M. at 118.
85 Id. (quoting James J. Kilpatrick, Op-Ed., $1.2-billion Worth of Hindsight, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Mar. 8, 1988, at 19A.)
84 See MALKIN, supra note 6, at xxxiii—xxxv.
85 See id.
88 That work has been amply done elsewhere. See Postings of Eric L. Muller and Greg
Robinson to The Volokh Conspiracy and IsTliatLe.gal? blogs, hup://www.isthatlegal.org/
Muller_ancl_Robinson_on_Malkin.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
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III. TRYING OUT AN ANALOGY: THE CULTURAL DEFENSE AND THE
"TEMPORAL DEFENSE"
In which discipline should the hole-filling project occur? Thus
far, the problem of defining historical injustice seems to have fallen
through the gaps between disciplines. Legal scholars have been con-
tent either to assume consensus about historical injustice or to use
presentist definitions that ignore the considerable problem of hind-
sight. 87 Historians are typically more concerned with explaining why
people acted as they did than with condemning particular policies
and choices 88 And philosophers have paid scant attention to the
problem.
Because the problem of defining historical injustice sits at the
intersection of law, history, and philosophy, the project will best pro-
ceed as a cross-disciplinary effort. This Article, however, seeks to begin
the dialogue by positing an analogy between the problem of defining
historical injustice and the well-known criminal law problem of judg-
ing the wrongdoing of immigrants from foreign cultures. The analogy
is admittedly imperfect, and does not single-handedly resolve the
difficulties of defining historical injustice. It is, however, a provocative
and helpful start.
Consider the following story: John and his lover Sara are from a
different culture from our own. John learns that Sara has had sex with
another man. In John and Sara's culture, a woman's sexual infidelity
is a grave insult to a man's honor. Their culture also tolerates corporal
punishment for such betrayals. John therefore gives Sara ten lashes
across the back with a whip. The trouble for John, however, is that he
and Sara no longer live in their culture of origin; they live in the
United States. Under twenty-first-century American law, John's actions
constitute the felony of aggravated battery. 89
John's case starkly presents the problem of the "cultural defense"
in the criminal law. Everyone called upon to assess John's culpabil-
ity—from the police officer who arrests and charges him, to the
prosecutor who negotiates with his lawyer for a possible guilty plea, to
the jurors who determine his guilt or innocence, to the judge who
ultimately sentences him—will have to decide whether and to what
87 See supra notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
88 See TREVOR BURNARD, MASTERY, TYRANNY, & DESIRE: THOMAS THISTLEWOOD AND
HIS SLAVES IN THE ANGLO-JAMAICAN WORLD 31 (2004) ("As historians, it is not our re-
sponsibility to attribute retrospective blame.").
89 See State v. Bell, 647 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (beating with a stick consti-
tutes aggravated battery).
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extent the norms of John's society of origin should extinguish or di-
minish John's culpability for whipping Sara. Do we treat John fairly if
we assess his conduct by reference to our cultural standards rather
than his? If, in fairness to John, we use his cultural standards rather
than ours, do we compromise our efforts to deter crime and thereby
place potential victims—especially powerless and vulnerable victims—
at greater risk?
Now let us change one aspect of John's case: John's native society
is not a foreign country, but rather eighteenth-century America. lie is
a plantation owner, and Sara is not just his lover, but also his slave.
Their culture is the culture of that day. What has brought John and
Sara to us is not a ship or an airplane, but rather the passage of time.
We are historians, looking back on John and Sara from our early-
twenty-first-century vantage point and trying to determine John's cul-
pability for whipping Sara for her sexual infidelity 200 years ago.
Intriguing questions very similar to those raised by the criminal
law's cultural defense now arise. As we assess the conduct and prac-
tices of an earlier generation, to what extent should we be bound by
that earlier society's norms? To be fair to John, must we credit what
we might call his "temporal defense"—that is, must we assess his be-
havior by reference to the standards of his day? Can we avoid judging
John's acts according to our own standards without undermining our
efforts to deter the type of misdeed that John committed? In sparing
John from judgment, do we make current and future generations of
potential victims more vulnerable to a reinfliction of the same type of
harm thatiohn caused long ago?
Note how powerfully these questions resonate with the defensive
strategies of the partisan historical revisionists. Michelle Malkin's case
for Franklin Roosevelt and his top military advisers is an instance of
what this Article terms a "temporal defense." She maintains that we
commit an injustice against our World War II leaders when we assess
their policy of Japanese American exclusion and detention from our
modern vantage point.90 We must assess it from theirs, and when we do
so, she maintains, it emerges as a reasonable military judgment rather
than the product of racism and hysteria.91
The analogy between cultural and temporal defense is striking,
and this Article maintains that it can teach us a great deal about how
to think about historical injustice. It bears emphasis, however, that the
See MALKIN, supra note 6, at xxxiii—xxxv.
DI See id.
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analogy of culture to time is far from perfect. Three difficulties
quickly present themselves, and they are all apparent in the story
about John and Sara. First, Immigrant John has presumably chosen to
join our culture and might therefore be more fairly saddled with
judgment by our culture's norms; Historical John made no such
choice. Second, Immigrant John, by virtue of his actual physical pres-
ence among us, has access to the behavioral and moral norms of our
society, can learn and follow them if he chooses, and is fairly con-
demned if he does not do so; Historical John is stuck in his moment
in the past and cannot know or follow the norms of today's society.
Finally, a message of forgiveness to Immigrant John (and his cultural
community in the United States) will pose clear and direct risks to
people living today—most immediately Sara, who will be left at John's
mercy if his conduct is excused. But to speak of "sending a message"
to Historical John and members of his generation is incoherent; they
are dead and gone. Any risk that excusing their misconduct poses to
current or future generations is therefore remote.
These objections based on choice, access, and risk are consider-
able, but they should not doom this Article's goal of launching a dis-
cussion about defining historical injustice. On careful examination,
each of the flaws in the analogy between culture and time is a bit less
problematic than it initially appears. Consider first the problem of
choice. Although it is true that many immigrants freely choose to
come to the United States, immigration is not an unfettered choice
for all immigrants. Some immigrants come here because danger ef-
fectively forces them to quit their native lands. 92 Many others, particu-
larly dependent spouses, children, and elderly parents come here be-
cause a more powerful family decisionmaker has decided to do so. On
the other hand, although people , from earlier times do not really
choose to "appear" at this (or any) particular moment in history, they
also really have no choice but to do so. Time marches on. People un-
derstand that later generations will scrutinize the choices they make
and the actions they take. Thus, especially if Immigrant John has fled
to the United States to save his life, or if he has been brought here by
someone else, his position with respect to the norms of today's domi-
nant culture is more like Historical John's than it may first appear.
92 The Hmong, who are the source of many cultural defense cases, are a good example
of this: by virtue of their support for the United States and South Vietnam during the
conflict with North Vietnam, it was dangerous for them to stay in Vietnam after the South
fell. See Tim PFAFF, HMONG IN AMERICA: JOURNEY FROM A SECRET WAR 49-63 (1995).
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Consider next the objection based on cultural access. For many
immigrants from cultures with practices that diverge significantly
from American behavioral norms, the American majority's culture is
often not especially accessible or intelligible. Many first-generation
immigrants (and in some communities, even later-generation immi-
grants) live culturally insular lives. 93 Economic, religious, linguistic,
and social barriers and preferences can keep them well apart from
the mainstream culture. By contrast, historical figures from the previ-
ous one or two generations whose actions are later challenged typi-
cally stand well within the cultural mainstream because the main-
stream changes slowly over time and usually conforms with at least
faintly visible trends. As between, say, a Vietnamese immigrant who
has lived entirely within San Francisco's Chinatown since arriving
three months ago and an American political figure from the World
War II era, it is not at all clear that the Chinese immigrant is able to
develop a clearer sense of current American cultural norms than the
World War II leader might have been able to extrapolate.
Consider finally the objection based on risk. On careful examina-
tion, the risk of excusing conduct that is approved or condoned in a
different culture is similar to the risk of excusing conduct that was
approved or condoned at an earlier time. In both cases, the excuse
endangers those who might again be victimized by the sort of behav-
ior that first caused injury. In the case of the cultural defense, there
are two potential groups of perpetrators and victims, one narrow and
one broad. The narrow group is the accused person himself and the
person or people he allegedly victimized. The broader group includes
other potential perpetrators, who might be encouraged to act if they
learn that American law condones a violent or harmful cultural prac-
tice, as well as the larger class of potential victims of that cultural prac-
tice. Similarly, the temporal defense also involves both a narrow and a
broad class of perpetrators and victims. The narrow class of perpetra-
tors and victims has of course passed away. But the broader class re-
mains—and this is the very heart of George Santayana's famous warn-
95 See generally RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (2003) (comparing assimilation patterns
among modern immigrant groups with those of earlier waves of immigrants to the United
States); ALKJANDRO FORTES & RUBEN RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STUDY OF THE IMMIGRANT
SECOND GENERATION (2001) (analyzing assimilation of second-generation immigrants);
Ruben G. Rutnbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, SellEsteem, and Segmented Assimilation
Among Children of Immigrants, 28 'wet, MIGRATION REV. 748 (1994) (studying the psychoso-
cial adaptation of children of recent immigrants to the United States).
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ing that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to re-
peat it. 94 To say that some past victimization was understandable, or
even perhaps justified under the circumstances, is to invite that sort of
victimization to recur if and when those types of circumstances reap-
pear. Why else were Arab American groups among the first and loud-
est to complain95 when U.S. Representative from North Carolina
Howard Coble said, after September 11, 2001, that he thought the
incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II was
justified?96 Undoubtedly, the risks the cultural defense poses to poten-
tial victims are more immediate and palpable than the risks of the
temporal defense. The difference, however, is one of degree, not
kind.
To be sure, the analogy between the cultural defense and its
temporal cousin is imperfect; judgment in a court of law is not the
same as judgment in the court of history. But the analogy does not
need to be perfect. It is not the goal of this Article to maintain that
the standards of the criminal law should strictly govern our reflection
on history. Rather, this Article's purpose is to initiate conversation
about the undertheorized problem of defining historical injustice. Its
claim is simply that the criminal law's cultural defense offers tools for
working through a set of problems similar to those we encounter
when we attempt to assess the wrongdoing of those who went before
us. Let us therefore examine the cultural defense and the progress
the criminal law has made toward solving those problems.
IV. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF CULTURAL AND TEMPORAL EXCUSES
The cultural defense in the criminal law is the subject of a fairly
rich literature, most of it less than twenty years old. 97 That literature
91 See George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905), reprinted in THE LIFE OF REA-
'SON: OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284 (2d ed. 1936).
95 See Prolslam.com , Howard Coble Supports Internment, http://www.proislam.com/
letter_against_coble.hun (last visited Aug. 24, 2006) (urging that Coble resign as Chair of
House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
96 See Republican Defends WM Internments, CBSNews.com , Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/07/politics/main539755.shtml.
97 See generally Daina C. Chits, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1994); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing
Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 Coua. L. REV. 1093 (1996);
Rashmi God, Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the Cultural Defense, 3 SEATTLE J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 443 (2004); Kim, supra note 9; Anh T. Lam, Culture as a Defense: Preventing
Judicial Bias Against Asians and Pacific Islanders, I ASIAN AM. ['sc. ISLANDS L.J. 49 (1993);
Maguigan, supra note 15; Kelly M. Neff, Removing the Blinders in Federal Sentencing: Cultural
Difference as a Proper Departure Ground, 78 CHL-KENT L. REV. 445 (2003); Alison Dundes
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is, perhaps not surprisingly, marked by disagreement. Something ap-
proaching agreement has emerged, however, on a couple of points.
First, most scholars now agree that a new, full-blown defense to crimi-
nal liability grounded in cultural difference is a bad idea.98 And sec-
ond, most scholars now agree that evidence of cultural practices
ought to be admitted, on a case-by-case basis, to support certain exist-
ing criminal law defenses.99
The boundaries of the debate over the criminal law's cultural de-
fense were marked in two law review pieces published in 1986. One, a
student note published in the Harvard Law Review, presented an un-
abashed plea for the recognition of a formal cultural defense that
would completely exonerate people who, through their cultural prac-
tices, commit criminal acts.19° The note's author contended that a de-
fense based in cultural difference is a necessary and sensible way of
honoring the nation's commitments to cultural pluralism and to indi-
vidualized justice.191 "A new immigrant," the author explained, "has
not been given the same opportunity [as a long-term resident] to ab-
Remelts, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S
&run. 437 (1993); Valerie L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the Misuse of Culture in Crimi-
nal Law, 13 Amz. j. & COMP. L. 523 (1996); Sharan IC Sint A Matter of Principle and
Consistency: Understanding the Battered Woman and Cultural Defenses, 7 Mien. J. GENDER & L.
107 (2000); Volpp, supra note 9; Wanderer & Connors, supra note 12; Note, The Cultural
Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 Ilmw. L. REV. 1293 (1986); Michaöl Fischer, Note, The Hu-
man Rights Implications of a "Cultural Defense,"6 S. CAL. INTrAunsc, Lj. 663 (1998); "[aryls F.
Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal Justice System
Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141 (1994); Neal A. Gordon, Note,
The Implications of Memetics for the Cultural Defense, 50 DUKE Lj. 1809 (2001); Andrew M.
Kanter, Note, The Yenaldlooshi in Court and the Killing of Witch: The Case for an Indian Cultural
Defense, 4 S. Ca. lunstunsc. L.J. 411 (1995); jisheng Li, Comment, The Nature of the Offense:
An Ignored Factor in Determining the Application of the Cultural Defense, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 765
(1996); Alison Matsumoto, Comment, A Place for Consideration of Culture in the American
Criminal Justice System: Japanese Law and thelKinntra Case, 4). INT'L L. & PRAC. 507 (1995);
Julia P. Sams, Comment, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense" as an Excuse for Criminal
Behavior, 16 GA. J. & Cors/v. L. 335 (1986); Sikora, supra note 15; James J. Sing, Note,
Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural Defense: Traditional or Formal?,
10 CEO. [mimic L.J. 241 (1996); Michele Wen Chen Wtt, Comment, Culture Is No Defense
for Infanticide, 11 Ara. U. j. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 975 (2003).
98 See generally Coleman, supra note 97; Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 13; Kim,
supra note 9; Magnigan, supra note 15; Remelt), supra note 97; Sacks, supra note 97; Volpp,
supra note 9; Goldstein, supra note 97; Sikora, supra note 15; Wm supra note 97.
gg See generally Coleman, supra note 97; Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 13; Kim,
supra note 9; Magnigan, supra note 15; Renteln, supra note 97; Sacks, supra note 97; ViApp,
supra note 9; Sikora, supra note 15; Wn, supra note 97.
100 See Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, supra note 97, at 1311.
101 See id. at 1298-307.
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sorb—through exposure to important socializing institutions—the
norms underlying this nation's criminal laws.'' 102 The author con-
ceded that a cultural defense might make it harder for the law to ar-
ticulate a coherent social order and to deter crime, but countered
that the effects might well be the opposite if immigrant groups came
to recognize that the American legal system is sensitive to their cul-
tural traditions. 103
The other 1986 piece, a student comment by Julia P. Sams in the
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, presented a full-
bore assault on the notion of a cultural defense. 104 Sams argued that a
complete cultural defense to criminal liability would be difficult to
administer because the legal system would have to decide which im-
migrant groups qualify for it and which do not, as well as who among
the qualifying groups deserve it and who do not. 105 She further con-
tended that a cultural defense would undermine the deterrent effect
of the law by removing an important incentive for immigrant groups
to learn American laws, 106 and would undermine the principle of le-
gality by placing "newcomers' ... opinions and ideas about the laws
... above the laws as declared by the officials."107 She also maintained
that a cultural defense would be unfair to members of the cultural
majority, to whom the defense would not be available.um Although she
recognized that "immigrant groups ... embellish society with their
diverse customs and beliefs," she concluded that those advantages
would be "nullified if United States residents are threatened by the
crimes of newcomers who are excused from punishment."
Since 1986, much has been written about the cultural defense.ith
Although the terrain remains contested, a middle ground has opened
up between the two poles fixed by those early pieces. That middle
ground does not include a new, free-standing complete defense for
102 Id. at 1299.
1°3 See id. at 1304-97.
04 See generally Sams, supra note 97.
105 See id. at 345-48.
1 °6 See id. at 348-50.
307 Id. at 352.
1°8 See id. at 350-51.
la° See Sams, supra note 97, at 353.
11° See generally Coleman, supra note 97; Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 13; Kim,
supra note 9; Maguigan, supra note 15; Neff, supra note 97; Renteln, supra note 97; Sacks,
supra note 97; Volpp, supra note 9; Wanderer & Connors, supra note 12; Fischer, supra note
97; Goldstein, supra note 97; Sikora, supra note 15; Sing, supra note 97; Tomao, supra note
97; VVu, supra note 97.
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cultural practices." Most scholars agree that an independent com-
plete cultural defense is both unnecessary and unwise.'" It is unnec-
essary because existing law already takes important cultural determi-
nants of a defendant's mental state into account.'" And it is unwise
for a number of reasons: the defense would, for example, undermine
the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and would plunge
the legal system into a messy and potentially offensive set of decisions
about what counts as culture and who counts as a true cultural practi-
tioner." 4
But by far, the most important reason scholars have advanced for
rejecting a free-standing cultural defense is that the defense would be
perilous for crime victims, especially women and children. 116 A large
percentage of cases involving the cultural defense are domestic abuse
cases—prosecutions of adult men who batter or kill women with
whom they are in relationships, and prosecutions of adult men and
women who abuse or kill their children." 6 To exonerate abusers on
the basis of a claim that their own culture does not condemn their
violence would make that violence harder to deter."
This poignant insight was apparent in the quoted reaction of one
battered Chinese woman to People v. Chen, a case in which a male Chi-
nese immigrant successfully invoked alleged Chinese cultural prac-
tices to win a sentence of probation for killing his adulterous wife.'"
nt See generally Coleman, supra note 97; Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 13; Kim,
supra note 9; Maguigan, supra note 15; Renteln, supra note 97; Volpp, supra note 9; Sikora,
supra note 15.
"2 The leading exception is Alison Dundes Remelt', who argues for what appears to
be a free-standing cultural defense in her 2004 book, The Cultural Defense. RENTELN, supra
note 14, at 200-01.1 say that she argues for "what appears to be" a free-standing cultural
defense because in actuality she believes that cultural evidence should be, and sometimes
is, admitted in support of existing criminal law defenses. Indeed, her main reason for in-
sisting on a free-standing cultural defense is what she views as the inappropriate reluctance
of judges to accept cultural evidence in support of existing defenses. See infra notes 147-49
and accompanying text.
" 3
 See Wanderer & Connors, supra note 12, at 873; Sing, supra note 97, at 1863-70;
Tomao, supra note 97, at 243-56.
" 4 See Kim, supra note 9, at 110-15; Maguigati, supra note 15, at 44-45; Wanderer &
Connors, supra note 12, at 873; Tomao, supra note 97, at 243-56.
118
 See generally Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against
Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991).
118 See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1105-13; Kim, supra note 9, at 101-02; Wanderer &
Connors, supra note 12, at 836-37; Sikora, supra note 15, at 1695-97.
114 See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1136-94; Rimonte, supra note 115, at 1326; Sacks, su-
pra note 97, at 541-42; Fischer, supra note 97, at 690-91; Sikora, supra note 15, at 1709-11.
118
 See Kim, supra note 9, at 119-21 (referencing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 21,1989)).
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"Even thinking about that case makes me afraid," the battered woman
explained. "My husband has told me: 'If this is the kind of sentence
you get for killing your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the
money for a good attorney." 119 This abused woman and many vulner-
able women and children like her would be the ones to bear the
brunt of a complete defense to criminal liability grounded in culture.
Not surprisingly, most scholars agree that further disempowering
those who are already vulnerable to violent attack is too high a price
to expect them to pay for a legal doctrine that would exonerate their
abusers.' 20
But just as the weight of scholarly opinion has rejected a com-
plete cultural defense, it has also rejected the notion that cultural
influences on a defendant's behavior ought to be irrelevant to guilt or
innocence. Scholars have recognized that in some situations, evidence
of cultural practices and beliefs might be relevant not to a new, com-
plete cultural defense but to old and well-established ones, especially
mistake of fact, lack of intent, and duress. 121 Consider, as an example,
the case of a Vietnamese immigrant parent charged with child abuse
for engaging in cao gio, or "coining"—the practice of massaging an ill
child's back with a medicated oil, and then rubbing the back with the
edge of a serrated coin. 122 If the child abuse statute requires proof of a
specific intent to harm the child, then evidence that the parent en-
gaged in cao gio in order to heal the child would be relevant—indeed,
probably crucial—to the issue of intent. Similarly, in a rape prosecu-
tion, evidence of cultural practices surrounding sexual intercourse
might tend to support a defendant's claim that he made a mistake
about the fact of the victim's consent.'" And a Yoruban immigrant
from Nigeria who makes tribal markings with a razor blade on her
112 Alexis Jetter, Fear Is Legacy of Wife Killing in Chinatown, Battered Asians Shocked by Hus-
band's Probation, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1989, at 4.
120 See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1136-44; Rimonte, supra note 115, at 1326; Sacks, su-
pra note 97, at 541-42; Fischer, supra note 97, at 690-91; Sikora, supra note 15, at 1709-11.
121 Kay L. Levine's excellent article Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture is es-
pecially useful on this point. See Kay L. Levine, Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Cul-
ture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 49-66
(2003). Holly Maguigan also has written an excellent article. See generally Maguigan, supra
note 15.
122 See Alison Dundes Renteln, Is the Cultural Defense Detrimental to the Health of Children?,
in 7 LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27,
39 (Rene Kuppe & Richard Potz eds., 1994).
123 This fact pattern alludes to the California case of People zt Moua See generally Evans-
Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 13 (discussing and analyzing at length People v. Mona,
No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1985)).
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son's face might be able to offer a defense of necessity or duress if she
can offer evidence that her culture predicted far greater harm to the
child if he was not so marked.124
To be sure, authors have emphasized that it is important for prose-
cutors to make evidence available to the fact finder that counters or
challenges defendants' cultural claims, in order to reduce the risk that
fact finders will be tricked into mistaking willfully' misogynist or child-
abusive conduct for innocent cultural practice.125 But the weight of
scholarly opinion has rejected the claim that all evidence of cultural
practice should be completely barred.126 Instead, it has settled around
the idea that cultural evidence ought to be admissible to support estab-
lished legal defenses based on the defendant's mental state.'"
These insights from the literature on the cultural defense offer us
guidance on the problem of defining historical injustices. On the one
hand, we benefit from the literature's firm recognition that cultural
context sometimes ought to temper judgment. That recognition reas-
sures us that our concern for the unfairness of judging with the benefit
of hindsight stands on something more substantial than a taboo against
speaking ill of the dead or a worry about how we will ourselves someday
be judged.128 The criminal law's recognition of the relevance of cultural
context also highlights the importance of an actor's mental state at the
time she acted. What that mental state might be for historical actors (as
opposed to living criminal defendants) remains to be seen. For now, it
is enough to note that the cultural defense offers support for the excus-
ing instinct that is at the heart of its temporal cousin.
That support, however, is drastically limited by the near-universal
insight in the criminal law literature that a freely available cultural
defense imperils the powerless by undermining the deterrent effect of
124 See Renteln, supra note 122, at 29-30.
I" See Maguigan, supra note 15, at 90-92.
126 Perhaps the most hostile to any use of cultural evidence is Doriane Lambert Cole-
man. Ste Coleman, supra note 97, at 1103-04 nn.47-48 (discussing inherent flaws in the
argument that custom could impair a defendant's ability to think rationally, and thus ne-
gate the mens rea requirement, but acknowledging that her discussion and analysis apply
only to situations where cultural evidence is used to exonerate an "otherwise criminal defen-
dant").
ID See Maguigan, supra note 15, at 87-88; Sacks, supra note 97, at 547-50; 1Nu, SUPIY4
note 97, at 1020-22.
128 See Thomas Babington Macaulay, Sir James Mackintosh (1835), reprinted in CRITICAI.
AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS: THOMAS BABINCTON, LORD MACAULAY 163 (Hugh Trevor-Roper
ed., 1965) ("As we would have our descendants judge us, so ought we to judge our fa-
thers.").
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the law. 129 A similar danger lurks in the temporal context. In every
generation there are ruling and ruled classes, and the distribution of
these groups across race; gender, and time in the American experi-
ence has not been random. The privileged and powerful of today are,
on balance, a good deal likelier to be the progeny of yesterday's elites
than of yesterday's oppressed. This is, in fact, precisely what makes the
task of judging the actions of earlier American generations' leaders so
difficult. Even though we are not related to them by blood, they are
nonetheless in some sense our ancestors by virtue of the leadership
positions they occupied, and our judgment is compromised by the
allegiance we feel we owe them. But when we too quickly excuse them
for their impositions on the powerless of their day, we deprive the
powerless of today, and their advocates, of the important example of
their experience. We undermine the deterrent effect of history, and
in so doing, create conditions that are more conducive to renewed
victimization. The criminal law's cultural defense thus reminds us that
suspending judgment of the wrongdoing of prior generations is not
harmless generosity to the departed. It carries a cost, and that cost
likely will be born by the powerless.
V. THE MENS REA OF HISTORICAL ACTORS
The preceding section might lead a reader to think that the lit-
erature on the criminal law's cultural defense has reached consensus
on the relevance and admissibility of cultural evidence. This is not so.
Although the more recent literature does not swing wildly from argu-
ments for wholesale exculpation to arguments for categorical inadmis-
sibility as it did twenty years ago, scholars now pursue a narrower set of
disagreements about the precise role that cultural evidence might
permissibly play at trial and in sentencing.'s° Those disagreements,
however, all work from the shared premise that the central legitimate
reason to admit evidence of culture is to shed light on the mental
I29 See Coleman, supra note 97, at 1136-44; Kim, supra note 9, at 111-12; Rimonte, su-
pra note 115, at 1326; Sacks, supra note 97, at 541-42; Fischer, supra note 97, at 690-91;
Sikora, supra note 15, at 1709-11.
150 Compare Kim, supra note 9, at 133-38 (proposing a framework for judges to deter-
mine whether to admit cultural evidence at criminal trials), with Neff, supra note 97, at
468-75 (advocating use of cultural evidence as a mitigating factor during sentencing), and
Sikora, supra note 15, at 1714-24 (arguing judges only should take cultural evidence into
account in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial).
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state of the accused. 13 ' This focus on the mental state of the actor
from a different culture will help us to develop a better understand-
ing of what we mean when we speak of the culpability of an actor
from an earlier day.
In a recent article, Kay Levine presents a compelling explanation
for the focus on mental state in the debate over the cultural de-
fense. 132
 She explains that the cultural defense raises a fundamental
question about the relationship between culture and action.'" At one
extreme, "soft" or "external" theorists of that relationship contend
that people choose their actions freely, without cultural influence,
and use culture merely to explain or justify what they have done.'" At
the other end of the continuum, "hard" or "internal" theorists main-
tain that culture "program [s]" actors to behave as they do, "eliminat-
ing their sense of agency or responsibility for their actions." 133 An in-
termediate position suggests a sort of feedback loop between an actor
and culture: an actor initially chooses his actions, but upon recogniz-
ing that certain actions fit within a larger cultural schema, he internal-
izes or appropriates that schema.'" The schema assumes an ever-
more-powerful role in determining the actor's conduct, and earlier
individual motivations recede. It becomcs intuitive, natural, and ulti-
mately coercive.'"
Levine argues that the cultural defense brings a claim of cultural
coercion into conflict with the baseline assumption of American
criminal law that people freely choose their actions and are individu-
ally responsible for everything they do.'" At the practical level, this
conflict between culture and autonomy plays itself out in disputes
about a criminal defendant's mental state.'" Inquiry into the mens
rea—the actor's allegedly culpable state of mind—is the logical place
for a finder of fact to determine the extent to which larger forces out-
"I See Maguigan, supra note 15, at 87-88; Sacks, supra note 97, at 547-50; Wit, supra
note 97, at 1020-22.
131 See generally Levine, supra note 121.
133 See id. at 42-43.
' 34 ht at 43.
135 Id. at 44.
139 Id. at. 45-46.
139 See Levine, supra note 121, at 46. This intermediate position, which Levine seems to
favor, comes from the work of the feminist anthropologist Sherry B. Ortner. See Sherry B.
Ortner, Patterns of History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of Sherpa Religious Institutions, in
COUTURE THROUGH TIME: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES 57, 57-93 (Emiko Ohnuki•
Tierney ed., 1990).
115 See Levine, supra note 121, at 46.
139 Id. at 47.
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side the defendant's own will and awareness shaped or dictated the
harmful act. 140 Levine concludes that evidence of culture ought to be
admissible where it undermines the defendant's criminal intent by
"provid[ing] a ... noncriminal explanation for the defendant's ac-
tions or where cultural demands place the defendant under extraor-
dinary stress and rob him of meaningful agency." 141 Levine contends
that no free-standing cultural defense to criminal liability is necessary
for this purpose because our well-established criminal law mens rea
defenses are adequate to the task. 142 On the other hand, Levine ar-
gues that cultural evidence should not be admissible where it does
nothing to disprove the defendant's intent to harm the victim, but
instead merely reveals that the defendant's culture tends to tolerate
such harm more readily than does American culture.' 45
Whereas Levine opposes a free-standing cultural defense to
criminal liability, Alison Dundes Renteln supports it. 144 In Renteln's
view, an independent, free-standing culture-based defense is necessary
to overcome the extreme reluctance of most judges to admit evidence
of cultural context in support of an existing criminal law defense." 5
In her recent book, The Cultural Defense, Renteln notes that a person's
cultural context often supplies that person's motive for engaging in an
act that harms another, even if it does not negate the person's intent
to do harm. That culturally-based motive, she contends, is at least par-
tially exculpating, even if it does not negate criminal intent and
thereby supply a fully exculpating excuse. What Renteln has in mind
is thus a partial excuse, a sort of generic lesser-included-offense for all
crimes that would be available to a defendant who acted from a cul-
turally-influenced motive."6
What is notable about the disagreement between Levine, an op-
ponent of a free-standing cultural defense, and Renteln, a supporter,
is a hidden point of agreement. Both believe that to the extent that
culture mitigates or cancels criminal liability, it does so because cul-
ture can undermine the culpability of a mental state. Renteln writes
clearly that "the rationale behind [a free-standing cultural defense]
140 See id.
141 See id. at 80.
142 See id. at 77 n.60. This is also a major thrust of Holly Maguigan's work. See Magui-
gan, supra note 15, at 87-90.
143 See Levine, supra note 121, at 75.
'" See RENTELN, supra note 14, at 200-01.
195 See id. at 189-201.
116 See id. at 191-92.
2006] 	 How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations Theory 	 687
... is that an individual's behaviOr is influenced to such a large extent
by his culture that either (1) the individual simply did not believe that
his actions contravened any laws, or (2) the individual felt compelled
to act the way he did." 147 Renteln wishes to be certain that the crimi-
nal law appropriately mitigates the liability of persons whose "cultural
conditioning predispose[d] [them] to act in certain ways," 1" and who
therefore acted with a "beneficent motive."'"
Levine makes more or less the same point in her work, but with
different words: the defendants entitled to mitigation are those whose
"cultural demands place [them] under extraordinary stress and rob
[them] of meaningful agency."'" As with Renteln, Levine's focus is on
cultural compulsion. She notes that a successful defense based on cul-
ture in a criminal case requires proof both that the defendant hon-
estly acted for the claimed cultural reason at the time of the harmful
act and that the defendant's "reliance on culture (rather than on
American legal standards) was reasonable."'" The inquiry into rea-
sonableness focuses on "the actor's (in)ability or (un)willingness to
disregard cultural prescriptions—to resist cultural schemas—in re-
sponse to the victim's behavior or mainstream social pressures." 152
Cultural schemas are not, after all, invariably and irreversibly coercive:
"A cultural frame that has been taken into the self can be taken out
again—when others fail to react in expected ways, for example, or
when circumstances change, or simply when a person matures." 153
Thus, Levine argues, the reasonableness of a defendant's reliance on
culture will turn on the degree of its chosenness. If the fact finder "be-
lieves that the defendant was able to operate outside of the schema
but simply chose not to do so, it will likely find her reliance on culture
unreasonable." r54
If scholars agree that harmful acts are excusable to the extent
that a defendant's cultural framework compelled her to act as she did,
then perhaps something similar might be true for the cultural de-
fense's temporal cousin. The analogy is admittedly not easy to draw
because historians, unlike lawyers, do not have doctrines (or even
142 Id. at 187.
155 Id. at 13.
110 RENTELN, supra note 14, at 201.
15° Levine, supra note 121, at 80.
151 See id. at 48.
152 Id.
155 See id. (quoting Ortner, supra note 137, at 89).
151 Levine, supra note 121, at 48.
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really much of a vocabulary) of culpability. Historians are simply not
accustomed to examining the mens rea of historical actors.155 But the
literature of the cultural defense suggests fairly clearly that compulsion
and choice are important factors in assessing the culpability of the ac-
tions of past generations. To what extent, we should ask, did the po-
litical and social climate, the moral norms, and the behavioral expec-
tations of the actor's day compel her to do what she did? To what
extent was it possible for the person to act differently and more con-
sistently with what would emerge as the standards of a later age? To
what extent can we look back on the actor's behavior and see it as a
choice of consequence, an act of independent moral agency?'56
A number of factors will inform this inquiry into the historical
figure's agency. At a basic level, we must ask whether the circum-
stances of the actor's time allowed any access at all to standards differ-
ent from his own. Consider, for example, a hypothetical Virginia
planter in the year 1690 who made a decision to switch his crop from
wheat to tobacco. A modern anti-smoking activist, who knows that to-
bacco is an addictive agent of illness and death for millions of smok-
ers, might condemn this decision. But that activist surely cannot con-
demn the planter's decision in its own historical moment. Tobacco's
lethal properties were not known in the late seventeenth century—
"the relationship of tobacco to health lay deep in the shadow of igno-
rance."'" Attacks on smoking before the mid-nineteenth century
"were couched largely in moral, xenophobic, and economic terms,"158
not in terms of health. Indeed, seventeenth-century Englishmen saw
smoking as a defense against the plague.159 Even as late as the 1850s,
the leading English-language medical journal opined that smoking
155 See BURNARD, SUPTa note 88, at 31.
155 Historian Gordon A. Craig beautifully expressed this point about the choices con-
fronting historical figures in his essay entitled History as a Humanistic Discipline
To forget that the present is the result of many developments that might have
taken a different course and of decisions that might not have been made, or
not at the same time or in the same way, is seriously to foreshorten our his-
torical perspective and to indulge in linear thinking of the most restricted
kind. The duty of the historian ... is to restore to the past the options it once
had.
Gordon A. Craig, History as a Humanistic Discipline, in HISTORICAL LITERACY 134 (Paul
Gagnon ed., 1989).
157 RICHARD ILLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR,
THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 15 (1996).
158 Id. at 19-15.
159 M. at 15.
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could "be indulged in with moderation, without manifest injurious
effect on the health for the time being." 16° Just as the law might be
willing to entertain a claim in mitigation on behalf of a rainforest
tribesman suddenly plopped down in the middle of early-twenty-first-
century America, on the basis that the tribesman lacked any meaning-
ful access to a tradition other than his own, so should we be open to
such a claim on behalf of a temporally-remote ancestor.
Now contrast this Virginia planter's farming decision with the
decision of his hypothetical great-great-grandson to purchase slaves in
1840. A plea to suspend judgment of the nineteenth-century slave-
holding planter in deference to his historical moment is surely weaker
than the plea on behalf of his tobacco-harvesting forebear. Whereas
the late-seventeenth-century planter lived in a time of ignorant con-
sensus on questions of tobacco and health, the nineteenth-century
slave owner lived in a time of intense debate on the propriety of own-
ing other human beings. Change was afoot, and had been for some
time. 161
 The American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth
century had upended the earlier understanding of the world as a di-
vinely ordained hierarchy that assigned everyone—masters and slaves
alike—fixed positions of social and political contro1. 162
 Wilting in
1782, no less a figure than Thomas Jefferson had noted that "the
whole commerce between master and slave is ... the most unremit-
ting 'despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the
other."163
 By 1807, the slave trade had been abolished in England, 164
and a slave revolt had won independence for what would become the
Republic of Haiti. 165
 In the decades that followed, an abolition move-
ment took root and flourished in the United States even while South-
ern jurisdictions passed laws designed to protect the institution of
slavery and to make voluntary emancipation more difficult. 166
 Slavery
160 Id. at 16.
161 See BURNARD, supra note 88, at 104-06.
162 See ISAAC, supra note 1, at 46-47, 105, 180-83.
163 D.B. Davis, Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford: Was
Thomas Jefferson an Authentic Enemy of Slavery? (Feb. 18, 1970), in Wks THOMAS JEFFER-
SON AN AUTHENTIC ENEMY OF SLAVERY? 6, 6 (1970) (quoting 'THOMAS JEFFERSON, COM-
MERCE BETWEEN MASTER AND SLAVE (1782)).
164 See JAMES WALVIN, BLACK IVORY: SLAVERY IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 262 (Blackwell
Publishers Ltd. 2d ed. 2001) (1992).
165 See GEORGE F. TYSON, JR., TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURF. 25 (1973).
166 See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823, at 197-98 (1975); MERTON L. DILLON, SLAVERY Arrsciam: SOUTHERN SLAVES
AND THEIR ALLIES 1619-1865, at 148 (1990); ROBERT MCCOLLEY, SLAVERY AND JEFFERSON-
IAN VIRGINIA 2-4 (1964).
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itself (and not merely the slave trade) was abolished throughout the
British Empire in 1834. 167 Slave acquisition and ownership in the
1840s were inevitably acts of conscious moral choice in a way that they
had not been in an earlier time. Thus, just as a fact finder would be
interested in knowing whether a recent Hmong immigrant came to the
United States from a place of genuinely monolithic culture (his remote
home village in the Laotian mountains) or from a place of broad and
mixed influences (years of interim residence in an Asian metropolis),
we should be interested in knowing whether our ancestor lived in a
time of stasis on the practice in question or in a time of flux.
Also relevant to what I am calling the chosenness of past wrongdo-
ing is the position of the questioned practice in the cultural spectrum
of its day. We know, for example, that eighteenth-century Jamaican
slavery was a brutal institution 168—more so than the contemporane-
ous slavery of the southeastern United States. 169 Yet even within that
violent framework, we can identify sadistic sociopaths. Jamaican slave
owner Thomas Thistlewood did not confine himself to the flogging
and sexual harassment that were then common methods of slave con-
trol. He devised a punishment he called "Derby's Dose," in which he
whipped a misbehaving slave, rubbed "salt pickle, lime juice and bird
pepper" in the open wounds, forced another slave to defecate in his
mouth, and then gagged him for four or five hours.'" Thistlewood
also forced slaves to urinate into the eyes and mouths of others, and
sometimes rubbed slaves with molasses and left them naked outside
overnight to be devoured by mosquitoes. 171 Just as the law would insist
on knowing whether a particular immigrant's violent behavior is truly
an artifact of his culture or a deviant choice of his own, we should ask
the same question about the harms that our ancestors inflicted.
"Derby's Dose" was an outrage even in its time, and we should not al-
low arguments about hindsight and historical context to dull our ap-
preciation of that.
Just as the position of the wrongdoing in the spectrum of an era's
conduct is an important facet of the chosenness of past wrongdoing, so
is the position of the wrongdoer. Not every member of a generation
shares equally in the maintenance of its social and cultural practices.
Those who seek or inherit positions of influence and prominence
'67 See WALVIN, supra note 164, at 264.
168 See BURNARD, supra note 88, at 32-33,150,177-79.
le° See id. at 149-50.
17° See id. at 104.
m See id.
2006J	 How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations Theory	 691
bear special responsibility for those practices because they set an ex-
ample for others and are in a position to effect change. In this sense,
Thomas Thistlewood contrasts usefully with his contemporary, Lan-
don Carter. Both men were slave owners—Thistlewood in Jamaican
and Carter in Virginia.'" Thistlewood was notably more brutal with
his slaves than was Carter, but was also a "nobody" in the society of his
day—unknown outside his small Jamaican parish, and even there only
for his beautiful garden.n His influence—terrorizing as it was—
spread no further than the boundaries of his 160-acre fartmn
Carter, by contrast, was an heir to one of Virginia's great fami-
lies—the son of Robert "King" Carter, who owned more than 300,000
acres and more than 700 slaves and was, in the words of Rhys Isaac, "a
grandee among the grandees."n Landon himself, even after sharing
his father's estate with siblings, was one of Virginia's twelve richest
men and the owner of more than 400 slaves.'" He was also a member
of Virginia's House of Burgesses,n the presiding judge of his county
court, 179 the chair in 1774 of his county's committee to boycott British
goods,' 80 a friend of the powerful Lee family, 181 and, although not a
trained physician, a respected medical practitioner. 182 He was, in
short, a man of influence in his county and his colony's social and po-
litical life.
Some such men chose to free some or all of their slaves. Landon
Carter's nephew, Robert Carter III, an even wealthier man than his
uncle, began emancipating his 452 slaves in 1791, not much more
than a decade after his uncle's death, and continued the process
through the rest of his life. 183 Fellow Virginian George Wythe 184 and
172 See id at 7.
in ISAAC, supra note I, at xvii.
174 See BURNARD, supra note 88, at 9.
178 See a at 9-10.
178 ISAAC, supra note I, at xvii.
in Id. at 60.
08 M. at 123-61.
In Id. at 241.
1811 It at xviii—xix.
181 See ISAAC, supra note I, at 237,350 n.40.
182 See id. at 105-20.
183 See ANDREW LEVY, THE FIRST EMANCIPATOR: THE FORGOTTEN STORY Or ROBERT
CARTER, THE FOUNDING FATHER WHO FREED His SIAVES, at xi (2005). Although wealthier
than his uncle Landon, Robert Carter III was less politically influential. See id. at xi—xii.
I" See Philip D. Morgan, Interracial Sex in the Chesapeake and the British Atlantic World, in
SALLY HEMINGS & THOMAS JEFFERSON: HISTORY, MEMORY, AND CIVIC CULTURE 52,58-59
(Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 1999).
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Pennsylvanian John Dickinson185 made similar, if less sweeping, deci-
sions for emancipation. Other men, such as Virginian George Wash-
ington,'86 held on to their slaves during their own lifetimes but eman-
cipated them at death.
By contrast, Landon Carter—like fellow Virginians Thomas Jef-
ferson's'? and George Mason'88—emancipated no one either during
his life or upon his death. Indeed, unlike Jefferson and Mason, he
never spoke publicly against slavery or even registered hesitations
about the institution in his private diary. Landon Carter had a greater
opportunity than most men of his day to exert influence on his soci-
ety's continued endorsement of the ownership of human beings. With
that opportunity came responsibility. It is entirely appropriate for us
to weigh his failure to shoulder that responsibility as we assess his par-
ticipation in the slaveholding culture of his time.
To some, it might seem viscerally unfair to condemn centuries-
old acts that were not unambiguously immoral in their own time but
have become so in ours. The question that this Article explores, how-
ever, is whether such a declaration of historical injustice is any more
unfair than the decision our legal system makes to condemn a recent
immigrant from a foreign culture for an act that is not unambiguously
immoral in his own society but is in ours. There is no powerful reason
to think that it is.
Indeed, judging a historical event may well be less unfair than
judging an immigrant's conduct. A person charged with a crime risks
jail time and a monetary fine if convicted. His cultural defense is thus
grounded in due process concerns; he claims that he should not have
to surrender liberty and property for conduct that was not actually
culpable. In other words, the consequences of conviction are severe
enough to the defendant that he is in some sense owed consideration
of his individuating cultural circumstances. By contrast, when we
reflect on the conduct of a person from the past, nothing we say or do
can have any impact on his liberty or property. He is gone. If we judge
185 See State of Delaware, John Dickinson: The Slave Holder, littp://history.delaware.gov/
musetinis/jdp/jdpslave.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
186 See Mount Vernon Estate and Gardens, George Washington and Slavery, littp://www.
mountvernoti.org/learn/tneet_george/index.cfm/ss/10 I (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
187 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF TFIOMAS JEFFERSON
144-52 (1996).
188 See Mason Mystery, Imp://mason.glintedu/—rmellen/masonnlystery.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2006) (stating that Mason 'Was one of the first Americans and one of the very
first southern plantation owners to denounce slavery, yet he owned slaves until the day he
died").
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his conduct by the standards of his time rather than ours, we do so
not because we actually owe him anything or because he might suffer
the physical, emotional, or financial consequences of our judgment.
Perhaps we feel that we owe his memory a certain sort of consideration.
But surely living people who risk hard time in jail have a greater claim
to careful and contextually sensitive judgment than do people who
have passed on.
It bears emphasis that this Article does not contend that prior
generations are unentitled to contextually-sensitive judgment. Indeed,
even as to actors from prior generations who can be said to have cho-
sen to act in accordance with the wisdom of their times, rather than
embrace a mainstream challenge to it, this Article does not argue
against contextually-sensitive judgment. The Article maintains simply
that those historical actors do not deserve to be wholly excused for
the choices they made. It will usually turn out, however, that they do
not deserve to be wholly condemned either.
Again, the criminal law helpfully models the point. Where evi-
dence of cultural influence on behavior does not substantiate a tradi-
tional defense to criminal liability such as duress or necessity, that evi-
dence is not simply eliminated from consideration. Rather, it
reappears at the defendant's sentencing hearing, where the defen-
dant's lawyer offers it anew to place the defendant's behavior in con-
text and show how it is less culpable than similar behavior by a person
from the dominant culture.' 89 The purpose of a sentencing hearing is
to develop as complete an account as possible of the offender, her
background, and the circumstances of her offense, so that the judge
may tailor the offender's punishment to her culpability. 190 The in-
quiry is "broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of in-
formation [the sentenced may consider, or the source from which it
may come." 19 ' Thus, the defendant who fails in his effort at outright
acquittal on grounds of culture nonetheless has the opportunity to
argue for a lesser sentence on the same grounds. Moreover, such an
opportunity should often succeed because a person who harms an-
other in a way common to his foreign culture is, in fact, less culpable
189 See Maguigan, supra note 15, at 62-69 (discussing the use of cultural background in-
formation in plea bargaining and sentencing proceedings); Neff, supra note 97, at 445
(advocating consideration of cultural background information in sentencing). See generally
Sikora, supra note 15 (arguing a defendant's cultural circumstances should be allowed to
serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
199 See United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226,1235 (11th Cir. 1991).
191 Un ited States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972).
694 	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:659
than an otherwise similarly-situated American who causes the same
harm with no cultural support.
Something quite similar obtains when we consider the case of a
historical actor who chose to embrace rather than challenge the
harmful mores of his day. Even if we decide that a monolithic morality
in his era did not completely prevent him from choosing different
actions, we still owe him careful consideration of the circumstances of
his time. We must ask how much debate on the moral question his
society actually knew, and whether he had access to it. We must ask
what costs the historical actor would have faced for making a different
choice, and whether he was able to shoulder such a burden. The an-
swers to these questions will, and should, temper our judgment of the
choice he made. But they should not direct us to suspend our judg-
ment entirely. Such considerations should not lead to the whitewash-
ing position of the partisan revisionist who dismisses every claimed
injustice as a mere product of its time.
A final example will illustrate the point. Consider a hypothetical
Virginia planter who purchased slaves in 1690. We already have seen
that slave acquisition in the mid-nineteenth century was an inevitably
contestable choice. 192 This was markedly less true in 1690. 1" A relig-
ious condemnation of slavery was certainly emerging. It was, however,
new; only in 1688 did an American religious movement publicly ar-
ticulate a case against slavery.'" And that movement was the Quak-
ers—one centered in the mid-Atlantic colonies, with which our hypo-
thetical Virginia planter would have been, at best, barely familiar.
Other anti-slavery voices, most notably that of British slavery aboli-
tionist Thomas Tryon, were also starting to be heard late in the seven-
teenth century, 195 but they were relatively few and had not yet begun
192 See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
199 1n the late-seventeenth century, the practice of slavery in the American colonies was
still in the process of formation. See DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY: THE CRU-
SADE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 5-12 (1961) (discussing the evolving legal status of the
institution of slavery in American colonies during the late-seventeenth to early-eighteenth
centuries). Although Philippe Rosenberg argues powerfully that "the development of anti-
slavery opinion in Britain was coextensive with the institutionalization of slavery itself,"
Philippe Rosenberg, Thomas Tryon and the Seventeenth-Century Dimensions of Antislavery, 61
WM. & MARY Q. 3D 609, 640 (2004), it is nonetheless clear that late-seventeenth-century
antislavery sentiment was neither broad-based nor loud.
194 In 1688, a group of Pennsylvania Quakers issued the Germantown Petition, which
maintained that slavery was inconsistent with Christian principles. See DAVID BRION DAVIS,
THE PRORLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 308 & n.25 (1966); THOMAS E. DRAKE,
QUAKERS AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA 11-14 (1950).
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to draw significant attention in the colonies. The development of an
organized abolitionist movement in the colonies was still many dec-
ades off.'" Slave ownership in the Virginia of the 1690s therefore
stood in a different position from the slave ownership that followed
150 years later. In assessing the wrongfulness of a planter's slave own-
ership in 1690s Virginia, we must temper our judgment to take ac-
count of that different position.'"
VI. FIXING THE HOLE: A RETURN TO THE EXAMPLE OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT
To begin filling the hole in reparations theory torn open by par-
tisan historical revisionists, this Article has suggested an analogy be-
tween temporal and cultural excuse as a provocative and helpful start-
ing place for a theory of historic injustice. The Article cited recent
revisionist justifications of the Japanese American internment during
World War II as the leading example of the revisionist threat.'" It will
be helpful now to return to that example, to see how the lessons of
the analogy to the criminal law's cultural defense help bolster the
See Rosenberg, supra note 193, at 612. But see BURNAM), SUPra note 88, at 105-06
("Until 1750, antislavery sentiment was close to nonexistent").
1913 SeeDnioN, supra note 166, at 87-111 (discussing growing abolitionist sentiment in
early-nineteenth-century United States).
197 A difficult, perhaps intractable, problem remains. Must we say that slavery in a his-
torical era in which slave owners had no access whatsoever to all antislavery discourse was not
wrong in its time? Or has the entire human drama been played before a "natural law"
backdrop that would condemn some practices as wrong regardless of the context in which
they occurred?
"Fhis question is beyond this Article's scope. Two observations are, however, in order.
First, it is probably inaccurate to clai in there has ever been a slave owner at any time in
history who had truly no access whatsoever to an antislavery discourse. Surely, there was
always such a discourse among his slaves—a discourse from which the slave owner no
doubt insulated himself.
Second, a very careful inquiry into the true diversity of opinion and argument in a
given historical period is essential before resorting to natural law. It is tempting to view an
era's prevalent discourse as more monolithic than it actually was. Trevor Burnard, for ex-
ample, asserts that "until 1750, antislavery Sentiment was close to nonexistent." BURNARD,
DOM note 88, at 105-06. Yet Philippe Rosenberg, a scholar whose work focuses on the
precise issue of pre-1750 antislavery discourse, asserts otherwise and identifies a significant
number of published critiques of slavery in the British world in the late-seventeenth and
early-eighteenth centuries. See Rosenberg, supra note 193, at 626, 640. If Rosenberg is cor-
rect, and there never really was a period of institutionalized slavery in the British Atlantic
without antislavery argument or agitation, then it may not be necessary to resort entirely to
natural law to assess the wrongfulness of late-seventeenth-century slaveholding in its time.
Mg See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
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conclusion that the Roosevelt Administration's policies were an injus-
tice even in their own time.
The plea on behalf of those who designed and approved the pro-
gram of Japanese American exclusion and detention is that, in the con-
text of the vicious Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the
military threat that Japanese forces posed to the United States main-
land in the following months, the mass prophylactic detention of all
people of Japanese ancestry along the West Coast was necessary and
understandable. The argument is that the American people were
justifiably shocked and frightened by Pearl Harbor and believed this
preventive measure was needed. As Alan Simpson stated on the floor of
the U.S. Senate during debate on what would become the Civil Liber-
ties Act of 1988, "at that time, in most every structure of our citizenry,
our Government and our bureaucracy, it seemed the very right thing to
do." 199 If this observation is accurate, then it would be very difficult to
fault the architects of the government's program for setting up a struc-
ture that was universally considered wise. To fault them, it seems, would
just be, as Michelle Malkin argues, an unfair condemnation of "serious
men ... who did not have the luxury of a rearview mirror." 29°
The trouble with this view is that the historical record does not
support a story of monolithic support and approval of the govern-
ment's program. Not every American believed in the military necessity
of evicting and jailing the West Coast's Japanese American population.
Indeed, very powerful and articulate people in the American main-
stream opposed the program. And Franklin Roosevelt, who gave the
order approving the War Department's eviction and detention of Japa-
nese Americans, had easy access to these substantial opposing views.
When Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, he knew that the
top officials in his Justice Department had vigorously opposed it. 2°'
In debates with War Department officials, James Rowe and Edward
Ennis, two top deputies to Attorney General Francis Biddle, argued
that the forcible relocation of American citizens of Japanese ances-
try (as opposed to Japanese aliens) would be illegal 202 Rowe 20s En-
199 134 CONG. Rec. 4386, 4392 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simpson), available at http://
bss.sfsmecht/internment/Congressional%2ORecords/19880420b.html#simpson.
200 MALKIN, supra note 6, at xxxiv.
201 Peter Irons's book JUSTICE AT WAR is the most detailed account of the inter-
departmental wrangling that preceded Roosevelt's decision to approve of the War De-
partment's proposal to evict Japanese Americans from the West Coast. See IRONS, supra
note 55, at 25-74.
2" See id. at 55, 62.
205 See id. at 44.
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niS,2" Biddle,206
 and Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Direc-
tor J. Edgar Hoover206
 all maintained that a program of mass re-
moval and relocation was entirely unnecessary. Biddle made this po-
sition clear to Roosevelt in a meeting on February 7,1942, just four
days before Roosevelt orally approved the War Department's plan. 207
In short, it is simply not true that eviction and incarceration seemed
"the right thing to do" to everyone who had lived through the
trauma of Pearl Harbor. It seemed the wrong thing to Roosevelt's
own Attorney General and to the Director of the FBI.
It also seemed the wrong thing to the two men who had pre-
ceded Francis Biddle in the Attorney General's Office in the Roose-
velt Administration—Frank Murphy (1939-1940) and Robert H. Jack-
son (1940-1941)—both of whom had become Associate Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Reluc-
tantly concurring in the Court's 1943 decision upholding the consti-
tutionality of a dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed on Japanese Americans,
Justice Murphy described the race-based curfew as bearing "a melan-
choly resemblance to the treatment accorded to members of the Jew-
ish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe." 208
 The curfew,
Murphy said, went "to the very brink of constitutional power." 209
A year later, Justice Murphy dissented from the Court's 6-3 deci-
sion upholding the Administration's program evicting Japanese
Americans from their homes and indefinitely excluding them from
the West Coast. 210
 Murphy's condemnation of the program was stark.
Citing his words of a year earlier, Murphy charged that the Admini-
stration's program went "over 'the very brink of constitutional power'
... into the ugly abyss of racism." 211
 It stemmed from "an erroneous
assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity," 212
and the justifications offered by the government were nothing but "an
accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinua-
tions that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by
people with racial and economic prejudices."215
 Justice Murphy called
204 See id.
222 See id. at 53.
220 See IRONS, supra note 55, at 27-29.
222 See id. at 53.
222 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, I 1 1 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
222 Id.
210 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,233-42 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
211
 Id. at 233.
212 Id. at 235-36.
212 Id. at 239.
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the Administration's program a "legalization of racism, ... unattrac-
tive in any setting but ... utterly revolting among a free people who
have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the
United States."214
Justice Jackson, not just a former U.S. Attorney General but also
a close friend and confidante of President Roosevelt, 215 also con-
demned the eviction and exclusion of Japanese Americans on the ba-
sis of the military's flimsy claim of necessity. In Korematsu v. United
States in 1944, Jackson emphasized that the only thing that made Fred
Korematsu's continued presence in California a crime was the ances-
try he inherited from his parents. 216 His conviction for violating the
military's exclusion order therefore violated the "fundamental as-
sumption underl[ying] our system ... that guilt is personal and not
inheritable."217 To "approve [what] the military ... deem[ed] expedi-
ent," said Justice Jackson, the Court had to "distort the Constitu-
tion"218 and to "validate the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens." 219
Neither is it the case that the American people as a whole be-
lieved in the military necessity of incarcerating the West Coast's entire
Japanese American population. Well-respected Americans publicly
and articulately opposed the plan. Consider, for example, a letter that
a group of prominent American educators, politicians, businessper-
sons, and artists sent to President Roosevelt on April 30, 1942. 220 Al-
though they said they "recognize [d] fully the difficulties of the situa-
tion" involving Japanese Americans on the West Coast, they maintained
that they had seen "no adequate evidence ... that an order giving
complete power to the Secretary of War or to the commander of each
military area to exclude from designated areas all citizens, or to restrict
214 Id. at 242.
215 See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN (2003).
216 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
217 Id.
218 Id. at 244-45.
219 Id. at 246. Justice Roberts also dissented in the Korematsu case, condemning the
program of eviction and exclusion as a clear violation of constitutional rights. See id. at
225-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that the case was one of "punishment [of an indi-
vidual] for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ances-
try, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty
and good disposition towards the United States").
229 Letter from Alfred M. Bingham et al. to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 30, 1942), re-
printed in Posting of Eric Muller to IsThatLegal?, The Hindsight Theory of the Japanese Ameri-
can Internment Takes (Yet) Another Hit, http://www.isthatlegal.org/archives/2006/05/the_
Iiindsight_tinml (May 23, 2006, 12:44 EST).
20061 	 lbw the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations Theory	 699
their actions in any way he sees fit, is either constitutional or demo-
cratic." Singling out "the Japanese alone" for these burdens, they ar-
gued, "approximates the totalitarian theory of justice practiced by the
Nazis in their treatment of the Jews."221 Signatories to this blunt and
contemporaneous condemnation of the government's evacuation pol-
icy included Alfred M. Bingham, the editor of the progressive journal
Common Sense, George S. Counts, the well-known sociologist and edu-
cational reformer; Countee Cullen, the African-American poet; John
Dewey, the founder of Pragmatist philosophy and educational re-
former; Sherwood Eddy, the national secretary of the YMCA; clergy-
man Harry Emerson Fosdick; University of North Carolina President
Frank Porter Graham; prominent Unitarians Mary W. Hillyer and
John Haynes Holmes; James Wood Johnson, the co-founder and ex-
president of the Johnson & Johnson Company; Christian intellectual
Reinhold Neibuhr; Clarence E. Pickett, the executive secretary of the
American Friends Service Committee; pastor and presidential candi-
date Norman Thomas; Mount Holyoke ex-president Mary E. Woolley;
and others.222 These were no fringe figures in American intellectual
and political life, and they made their dissent known to the President
at the very moment that the Administration was laying its plans for
long-term exclusion and detention.
Consider also an editorial by the highly regarded Washington Post
editorialist Merlo Pusey entitled "War vs. Civil Rights," published in
May of 1944.223 Pusey maintained that when the war was over, the na-
tion would be "very much ashamed" of the "mistreatment of loyal
American citizens of Japanese origin."224 Pusey pointed out that the
nation had seen "no sabotage by a Japanese American in this war,"
and that "[a]ir overwhelming majority of those who were ousted from
the Western States have never coriamitted a crime of any sort and have
always remained loyal to the United States."223 Pusey demanded to
know why "the Administration ... continues to punish loyal citizens
solely because of their racial origin."223 Predicting that the courts
would "compel the Administration to retreat from what many of its
own officials recognize to be an indefensible position," the columnist
called the exclusion and internment policies "black patches on an
221 Id.
2" See hi.
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otherwise very creditable record in the protection of civil rights."227
These are not the words of the lunatic fringe; they are the words of a
well-respected, nationally syndicated political columnist.
Merlo Pusey and the signatories to the April 1942 letter to the
President were hardly alone in their criticism of the government's
policies. A March 1943 article in The Reader's Digest criticized the poli-
cies as a costly mistake, noting that the supposedly dangerous Japa-
nese American population had been left more or less untouched in
Hawaii, that German Americans and Italian Americans on the East
Coast posed similar supposed dangers but also went untouched, and
that individualized loyalty inquiries would have been possible for a
fraction of the cost. 228 In June of 1942, Charles Iglehart wrote in the
pages of The Nation that "even as a war measure evacuation was un-
necessary."229 "The slumbering embers of public antagonism to the
alien group," he wrote, "were ... deliberately fanned by interested
persons and organizations until a conflagration was threatened, but at
any time it could have been quenched if the authorities had shown
the proper firmness."230 Writing in Commonweal in October of 1943,
Harold J. Filsicker argued that the military situation along the West
Coast was "well in hand" before the first evacuation orders were is-
sued, and that any potential danger to the Coast was "practically over"
before the process of exclusion was complete. 231 Articles critical of the
Japanese American program also appeared in The New Republic, Busi-
ness Week, Christian Century, Asia, Collier's, Time, Newsweek, Harper's, For-
tune, and The Saturday Evening Post magazines, among others. 232
Well-respected figures quite near the centers of American politi-
cal power and public life vocally opposed the wholesale exclusion and
incarceration of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World
War II. These prestigious opposing voices surely reached the ears of
the men who designed and implemented the program, as well as of
the President who authorized it and allowed it to operate for several
years. The program was not remotely foreordained; it was rather their
choice. In Kay Levine's words, these were men who were "able to oper-
227 Id.
228 SeeJ.P. McEvoy, Our 110,000 New Boarders, READER'S DIGEST, Mar. 1943, at 65-66.
229 Charles Iglehart, Citizens Behind Barbed Wire, 23 THE NATION, June 6, 1942, at 649,
649.
230 Id.
231 Harold J. Felsecker, Relocation Camps, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 1, 1943, at 578, 578-80.
232 Memorandum from Maj. C.R. Cartwright & Capt. Emanuel Aaronson to Civil Af-
fairs Div. (Oct. 2, 1945) (on file with author) (reporting on the survey of magazines and
number of articles appearing in each in opposition to the Japanese evacuation project).
• 	 2006)
	
How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations Theory 	 701
ate outside of the schema [of their time] but simply chose not to do
so."233 Their choice was a wrong one that shattered the lives of tens of
thousands of innocent Americans. The historical moment in which
they lived was not monolithic, and it does not excuse or minimize the
injustice of the choices they made. 234 Neither does it undermine the
extraordinary apology and redress that former internees and their
children and allies managed to secure in the 1980i and 1990s.
CONCLUSION
In June of 2005, Wachovia, the nation's fourth largest bank,
made a stunning announcement. Research had revealed that two of
its predecessor corporations had been involved in the market for
233 Levine, supra note 121, at 48.
234 Neither, it should go without saying, does their historical moment justify the choice
they made. In the criminal law, a defense of justification differs from a defense of excuse in
an important moral sense. Conduct that is excusable is conduct that is morally wrong but
contextually understandable. JosilUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 203 (3d
ed. 2001). Conduct that is justifiable is conduct that is morally correct—the right thing to
do in the circumstances. See Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality,
53 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-9 (2003).
The criminal law's cultural defense is a defense of excuse: the defendant's claim is not
that he acted rightly, but that his cultural context relieves him of responsibility for the wrong
choice he made. See Cordon, supra note 97, at 1810. Yet at times, the most enthusiastic de-
fenders of the wrongdoing of prior generations speak the language of justification rather
than excuse. When U.S. Representative Howard Coble recently defended the government's
wartime treatment ofJapanese Americans, he did not contend that the mass incarceration of
tens of thousands of American citizens was a contextually understandable judgment. He
maintained that it was a correct judgment, justified both to protect Japanese Americans from
vigilante violence and to protect the United States from those Japanese Americans who
meant the country harm. See Associated Press, N.C. Rep.: Internment Camps Were Meant to Help,
FoxNews.com, Feb. 5, 2003, http://wwwfoxnews.com/story/0,2933,77677,00.html.
This sort of enthusiasm for the wrongdoing of the past is doubly dangerous. Not only
does it carry all of the risk of a recurrence of the tragedy that this Article has described,
but it also entails a disturbing conclusion about people who resisted the action that caused
them harm. The criminal law shows this clearly: a person who resists a justified aggressive
act acts culpably, whereas a person who resists an excusable aggressive act does not. See
Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique
of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 61, 61-62 n.2 (1984). A person may
lawfully resist an insane person who threatens deadly force, but may not lawfully resist a
person who acts in self-defense. See id.
The consequence of justifying (as opposed to excusing) the harmful acts of a prior
generation is therefore to condemn those who resisted them. SeeJAMEs W. LOEWEN, LIES
Acitoss AMERICA 28 (1999) t is hard for residents of Edgefield to honor Americans
who fought against the Vietnam War so long as their downtown monument credits those
who fought in the war for being right."). If the eviction and incarceration of Japanese
Americans was a justified program, then Fred Korematsu acted wrongly when he decided
not to report for detention as ordered. See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
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slaves in the nineteenth century: The Georgia Railroad and Banking
Company had owned 162 slaves between 1836 and 1842,235 and the
Bank of Charleston had accepted 529 slaves as collateral on loans and
mortgages between 1841 and 1860.236 "We are deeply saddened by
these findings," Wachmia said. "[We] apologize to all Americans, and
especially to African-Americans and people of African descent."237 As
compensation, the bank committed to donate $11 million to charities
emphasizing African-American educational causes?" Wachovia was,
moreover, not the only American bank to make such an announce-
ment in 2005; JP Morgan Chase,239 Bank of America,249 and Lehman
Brothers"' each made similar announcements about predecessor en-
tities and committed to similar compensatory schemes during 2005.242
This did not sit well with Jeff Jacoby, a syndicated columnist for
the Boston Globe. In a column entitled The Slavery Shakedown, Jacoby
rehearsed the common arguments against reparations for slavery:
"Living white Americans bear no culpability for slavery," he argued,
"and living black Americans never suffered from it."243 Jacoby added a
new twist, however: not only was Wachovia's trade in slaves too remote
to permit reparations, but "[t]he slaves for which [Wachovia] was so
apologetic were owned decades before the Civil War, when slavery was
235 See Summary of Research on Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, http://
www.wachovia.com/file/Summary_of Research_Georgia_Railroad_mid_Banking_Gompan
y.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
236 See Summary of Research on Bank of Charleston, http://www.wachovia.com/
files/Summary_of Research_Bank_of Charlestompdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
237 Press Release, Wachovia, Wachovia Completes Research of Predecessor Companies
( June 1, 2005), available at http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/0„134_307%5E1191,
00.1nml.
238 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Bank Ups Giving to Black Causes, CUSARLOTTE OBSERVER,
July 29, 2005, at ID.
2" Id.
24° National Legal and Policy Center Accuses Bank of America of Cowardly Conduct by Apologizing
for Alleged Ties to Slavery, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 25, 2005, Intp://releasesaisnewswire.com/Get
Release.asp?id=52081.
24' Press Release, NLPC, NLPC Criticizes Lehman Brothers' Slavery Apology (Sept. 13,
2005), available at http://www.n1pc.org/view.asp?action =viewArticle&aid =1061.
142 All of the corporate soul-searching research was prompted by a Chicago ordinance
that requires all banks doing business with the city to disclose their past ties to slavery. See
City of Chicago Reparation Ordinance Gets Support from Mayor Richard M. Daley, U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, Oct. 21, 2002, http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/us_mayor_newspaper/
documents/10_21_02/chicago.asp.
243 SedeffJacoby, Op-Ed., The Slavery Shakedown, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 2005, available
at Intp://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/06/09/the_
slavery_shakedowit.
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still lawful throughout the South."244 That last clause bears repeating:
"when slavery was still lawful throughout the South." The mind struggles
to grasp the relevance of the fact that slavery remained technically
lawful in the South in the two or three decades before the Civil War.
Could it be that the syndicated columnist was subtly offering a substan-
tive defense of the ownership of slaves?
That is precisely what he was doing. A line or two later in the col-
umn, Jacoby summarized his criticism of Wachovia's slavery apology:
it was contrition "for something Wachovia didn't do, in an era when it
didn't exist, under laws it didn't break." 245 This is not simply an argu-
ment that Wachovia's predecessors' wrongs were too remote in time
to redress. It is an argument that Wachovia's predecessors broke no
law—that is, that there is no wrong to redress. 246 According to Jacoby,
the argument for reparations is not just impractical or logically
flawed. It makes "a mockery of historical truth"247—the historical
"truth" that these banks' ownership of human beings between 1836
and 1860 was not an injustice, because it was lawful. 248
The supposed concern for "historical truth" and the insistence
that slave owners be judged under the legal code of their time should
look familiar. These are the strategics of partisan historical revision-
ism—the germ of Michelle Malkin's justification of racial internment,
now spread to American chattel slavery.
Reparations theory is woefully unprepared to meet the challenge
of partisan revisionism. It has a rich language for debating and speci-
fying the remedies for historical injustice, but it lacks even a basic lan-
guage for specifying what ought to count as a historical injustice. This
Article has argued that the criminal law's cultural defense, focusing,
as it does, on the extent to which a perpetrator consciously chose to
inflict harm, offers an analogy from which a language of historical
injustice might develop. It is not a perfect analogy. By itself, it cannot
plug the growing hole in the foundation of reparations theory. That
important repair job will require more than simply a single provoca-
tive analogy from the criminal law—it will require a conversation
844 Id.
245 Id. (emphasis added).
248 At other points in the column, Jacoby spoke of slavery as "wrongdoing," which is
inconsistent with his insistence that the banks had broken no laws. See id.
241 Id. (emphasis added). 	 •
248 The National Legal and Policy Center, probably the leading lobbyist against slavery
reparations, makes this argument as well. See PETER FLailEirry & JOHN CARLISLE, THE CASE
AGAINST SLAVE REPARATIONS 5 (2004), available at http://www.n1pc.org/pdfs/Final_NLPC_
Reparations.pdf ("As tragic as slavery was, it was legal in the South between 1789 and 1865?).
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among historians, philosophers, and legal scholars. But time is of the
essence. Partisan revisionists are hard at work weakening the founda-
tions of redress and of American historical understanding, and they
are on the television, radio, and the best-seller lists. The conversation
must begin promptly.
